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Executive summary 
 
To analyse the energy and economic consequence of an Iranian oil embargo, five different 
scenarios are analysed that basically reflect an increasing degree of oil scarcity from Scenario 
1 to 5b below.  
1. "Baseline": The "business-as-usual" development. Hence, no sanctions imposed.  
2.  "Small Coalition": All individual EU27 Member States, USA, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan impose a unilateral import boycott on oil from Iran. The 
exports of Iran do not decrease but are redirected to countries that do not participate in 
the boycott. The coalition countries find their oil supply outside Iran. 
3. "Intermediate Coalition": Same conditions are for the "Small Coalition" above, 
except that the Iranian oil exports to the Small Coalition countries are not 
compensated by higher exports to other markets, and the Iranian production of crude 
oil decreases by 20%. 
4. "Grand Coalition": All countries in the world impose a unilateral oil import boycott 
from Iran, shutting down part of its production (Iran still produces for internal needs).  
5. "Hormuz": The Strait of Hormuz is blocked and no oil exports are let through. Two 
cases are being reviewed, depending on the availability of the pipeline going through 
the Red Sea and Israel-Lebanon (Saudi Arabia), Syria and Turkey.  
a. "Hormuz Optimistic (High Pipeline Capacities)": About 60% of the Gulf 
oil production (excl. Iran) can be exported through the pipeline system.  
b. "Hormuz Pessimistic (Low Pipeline Capacities)": About 45% of the Gulf 
oil production (excl. Iran) can be exported through the pipeline system. 
We calculate the macro-economic impacts applying the global general equilibrium model 
GEM-E3. This results in an estimate of the impact of the supply shock in the 
macroeconomic equilibrium. The international oil and energy markets are assessed with 
the POLES model. This provides the impacts in prices and quantities in the international 
energy (oil) market resulting from the different supply and demand situations for every 
scenario. Impacts on trade flows regarding refined oil products are estimated with the 
OURSE model. 
 The analysis shows that a unilateral embargo by the "Small Coalition" hardly has an 
effect on Iran‟s economy. The "Grand Coalition" and "Hormuz" scenarios, however, 
give an impact of 17-18% of GDP to Iran‟s economy, whereas the impact of the 
Intermediate Scenario is lower (5.7% of GDP).  
 Impacts on the international oil market are negligible in the "Small Coalition" scenario 
and remain limited in the "Grand Coalition" scenario. In the "Hormuz Optimistic" and 
"Hormuz Pessimistic" scenarios, on the contrary, the oil price increases are more than 
80% and 120% compared to baseline levels, respectively, on average for a two-year 
period. 
 The lower oil availability in the "Grand Coalition" scenario has a cost for the world 
economy of 0.34% compared to the baseline. Iran is the single most affected country 
(17% GDP contraction). With a GDP decrease of 0.49%, the EU on average suffers 
more than the global economy. Countries with a relatively higher reliance on oil 
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imports compared to their GDP are stronger affected. India (-0.83%) belongs to this 
group, but also some EU countries like Estonia, Portugal, Cyprus. Less affected 
countries are either very energy efficient such as Japan (-0.38%), or they have an 
important domestic production of crude oil, such as USA (-0.31%). 
 In the two "Hormuz" scenarios we assume that either 45% or 60% of the Gulf oil 
exports can be transported through existing pipelines. Even though the difference 
seems of limited nature (i.e. 15 percentage points), it leads to drastically different 
results in terms of global GDP (0.6 percentage points). This shows that the world 
economy becomes increasingly sensitive to supply shocks the scarcer the oil becomes. 
This also underlines the possible role of spare capacity beyond the Gulf region. 
 The impact on the GDP in the EU could reach -3% compared to a baseline in the 
"Hormuz Pessimistic" scenario, with important differences across EU Member States 
influenced by the importance of oil imports in their economy, and almost 2% in the 
USA. At global level, the GDP would be reduced by around 2%. 
 The size of the economic impacts of the "Hormuz" scenarios (between 1.5 and 2% 
loss of the global GDP) makes them unlikely to be very „stable‟ scenarios on the long-
term. 
 The scenarios not only have losers but also winners. In particular the major oil 
exporting countries as Russia and some Gulf countries (depending on the scenario) 
could temporarily benefit from the increase in oil prices. 
 The costs of oil in the OECD and the EU economy would only be slightly affected in 
the "Grand Coalition" scenario, but could more than double from today's (elevated) 
levels for one year in the "Hormuz case". Since in the latter case the high oil prices 
trigger an important reduction in oil demand, oil costs would fall rapidly again to 
reach below-baseline levels once supply is restored. 
 Refinery output in both Northern and Southern Europe remains more or less at 
baseline levels in the "Intermediate Coalition" and "Grand Coalition" scenarios in 
2014. The larger volumes of Iranian crudes that are currently used in Southern Europe 
can be replaced by a blend of different other crude types without any major increase in 
prices and technical difficulty. In both "Hormuz" scenarios, the Southern European 
refinery output would decrease due to a higher dependence on oil imports from 
Middle East. All in all, though, the total European refinery production decreases less 
than demand, leading to higher exports and a larger share of own production compared 
to the baseline.  
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1. Introduction 
On 23 January 2012 EU foreign ministers decided to ban new contracts to import oil and 
petroleum products from Iran and to end existing contracts by 1 July 2012 as part of a 
diplomatic strategy aimed at raising the cost of Iran‟s defiance of the international community 
over its nuclear program. Other countries such as the US are also preparing to sanction Iran‟s 
crude oil exports. Iran has responded by threatening to disrupt the flow of oil through the 
Strait of Hormuz, the world‟s most important oil chokepoint; about 35 percent of seaborne 
traded oil moves through the Strait (EIA, 2011).  
The increasing pressure on Tehran's government has already added a significant "Iran 
Premium", perhaps 10 to 20 US dollars per barrel (as of March 2012), to the current price of 
crude oil, possibly as an anticipation of future events. Any escalation may further increase the 
oil prices. As, historically, high oil prices have contributed to a number of economic 
recessions, the increase of the "Iran Premium" is particularly troubling given the current 
fragile state of the global economy.  
In this study, we analyse four major scenarios and compare them to a baseline scenario. The 
"Small Coalition" scenario, the "Intermediate Coalition" and the "Grand Coalition" scenarios 
are dealing with an oil embargo on Iran only. They differ in the coalition size of the oil 
embargo. In the "Small Coalition" scenario, all EU27 Member States, USA, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan impose a unilateral embargo on oil imports from Iran. The 
exports of Iran do not decrease but are redirected to countries that do not participate in the 
boycott. The coalition countries find their oil supply outside Iran. 
In the "Intermediate Coalition" the same countries impose an embargo; on top, it is assumed 
that the lower Iranian oil exports to these countries are not compensated by higher exports to 
other markets. In the "Grand Coalition" scenario the oil embargo on Iran is world wide. The 
two "Hormuz" scenarios (differing in assumed pipeline capacity) assume that the transport of 
oil through the Strait of Hormuz is completely disrupted. Here, not only oil exports from Iran 
are affected, but also the oil supply from major exporters such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, 
Iraq, Bahrain and Qatar is affected. 
Figure 1: The Strait of Hormuz 
 
Source: Financial Times 
 2. Methodology: models used 
To assess the economic and energy impact of the scenarios we apply three models in an 
integrated manner. We calculate the macro-economic impacts applying the global General 
Equilibrium Model for the Economy, the Energy system and the Environment, GEM-E3. This 
results in an estimate of the impact on key macroeconomic variables (such as GDP, and 
sectoral output) at the theoretical economic equilibrium after the supply shock. The 
international oil and energy markets are assessed with the POLES model. This model 
provides the impacts on prices and quantities in the international energy markets (including 
the oil market) resulting from the different supply and demand situations for every scenario. 
In addition, it indicates the reaction of oil supply by regions and shows how the energy 
consumption is reduced by sector and country. Unlike GEM-E3, POLES is a dynamic 
simulation model – hence, impacts are not immediate but occur over time. A closer look at the 
refinery sector and the impacts on the refined oil products markets is then undertaken with the 
OURSE model, using inputs from POLES.  
GEM-E3: GEM-E3 (www.gem-e3.net) is a multi-region, recursive dynamic computable 
general equilibrium model that covers the interactions between the economy, the energy 
system and the environment. GEM-E3 covers the entire economy and can be used to evaluate 
consistently the distributional effects of policies on the national accounts, investment, 
consumption, public finance, foreign trade and employment for the various economic sectors 
and agents across the countries. It is especially designed to evaluate environmental and energy 
policies. In the standard version, the model includes all 27 Member States of the European 
Union and all major non-European countries in a disaggregated manner, while the remaining 
countries are aggregated in regions. Furthermore, in this version 16 economic sectors are 
modelled and electricity production is depicted in a detailed manner. The geographical 
regions are linked through endogenous bilateral trade. The labour market is modelled 
following the efficiency wages approach which allows for non-voluntary unemployment and 
flexibility in wages. The government has nine categories of revenues. The model is able to 
compare the welfare effects of various environmental instruments in the context of climate 
and energy policies. It is also possible to consider various ways of revenue recycling.  
The current version of GEM-E3 is calibrated to the GTAP7 database with 2004 as base year, 
and with an extrapolation of data to 2010. 
The GEM-E3 model has been used to analyse climate and energy policies to support DG 
CLIMA, and to analyse tax reforms in the EU Member States for DG TAXUD / DG CLIMA. 
Ciscar et al. (2004) and Maisonnave et al. (2012) use earlier versions of the GEM-E3 model 
to simulate the impact of high oil prices (the latter focussing on the cross-relation with climate 
policies). 
POLES: The POLES model (Prospective Outlook for the Long-term Energy System
1
) is a 
global sectoral simulation model for the development of energy markets. It operates on a 
yearly basis up to 2050, with a very recent data update. Main exogenous inputs are economic 
growth and demographic projections for each region. POLES provides comprehensive energy 
balances (demand, transformation, and supply) for the 57 countries / regions covering the 
world and detailed oil and gas productions for 80 countries. Energy demand in 15 sectors is 
driven by income and derived activity variables as well as energy prices through short term 
                                                        
1
 The model was originally developed at the Centre National de la Recherche (CNRS) – Université de Grenoble 
(UG2) in France and is now collaboratively maintained and further developed at EDDEN-UG2, Enerdata and 
JRC-IPTS. 
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and long-term effects. In addition POLES provides a detailed description of the 
transformation sectors, in particular power generation.  
The endogenous calculation of international energy prices that balance supply and demand is 
one of the key features of the POLES model. Energy prices for the next modelling period are 
derived from comparing import and export capacities of each energy sub-market by using 
recursive simulation.  This feature of the model allows for the simulation of under- or over-
capacity situations, with the possibility of price shocks or counter-shocks similar to those that 
occurred on the oil market in the seventies and eighties. The model thus provides a consistent 
framework for studying the interconnected dynamics of energy development, energy policies 
(environment, fiscal regime) and resource availability.  
The preliminary results of the study presented in this document have been produced by the 
February 2012 POLES version, which uses 2010 data for most energy variables: 
consumption, production, capacity, prices. It captures the most recently updated information 
on oil production from OPEC countries (2011); an estimate of production recovery in Libya 
from its low 2011 level (full production in 2013) is also made. Macro assumptions are from 
the UN World population projection (2010 revision
2
, issued in 2011) and from IMF World 
Economic Outlook
3
 (issued in September 2011, revision January 2012)
4
.  
Table 1. Status of data in POLES 
Type of information 
Most updated info in 
POLES 
Source and date 
Population   2011 (-2050) UN (2011) 
GDP growth   2011 
IMF WEO (Sept 2011 - January 2012), DG 
ECFIN  and ECP (2011)4 
Other activity Mobility, .. 2009-10 Sectoral databases 
Energy 
demand  
All fuels, all sectors, all 
countries 
2010 IEA (2011), Eurostat (2011), Enerdata (2012) 
Energy Supply OPEC crude & NGLs 2011 IEA (2012) 
  
Other energies, other 
countries 
2010 IEA (2011), Enerdata (2012) 
Energy Prices Oil and gasoline 2010-11 IEA (2011), Eurostat (2011), Enerdata (2012) 
  Other energies 2010 IEA (2011), Eurostat (2011), Enerdata (2012) 
 
OURSE: The OURSE (Oil is Used in Refineries to Supply Energy) model is a world-wide 
aggregated model for the refinery sector designed to simulate the world oil product supply for 
the POLES model. OURSE is able to simulate the impact of changes in the crude oil supply 
on the world refining industry (in costs and qualities) as well as in the oil product demand (in 
terms of level, structure and specifications). A major update and recoding of the OURSE 
model was completed in 2011 (Lantz et al., 2012). The regional disaggregation in OURSE is 
less detailed than in the other models. It distinguishes between the North and West European 
region, which comprise France, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland and Southern Europe which contains Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Malta, 
Cyprus, Turkey, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, Albania. 
Results at the level of individual Member States or the EU-27 cannot be provided.  
                                                        
2
 http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ 
3
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/01/ 
4
 The resulting economic growth for Europe is consistent with figures given in "The 2012 Ageing Report" issued 
in 2011 by DG ECFIN of the European Commission. 
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3. Scenario definition and implementation 
In order to assess the several potential impacts of an embargo on Iranian oil, five different 
scenarios are analysed, reflecting an increasing degree of oil scarcity from 1 to 5b.  
1. "Baseline": The "business-as-usual" development. Hence, no sanctions imposed.  
2.  "Small Coalition": All individual EU27 Member States, USA, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan impose a unilateral import boycott on oil from Iran. Exports 
from Iran are redirected to other non-coalition consumers. The coalition countries find 
their oil supply outside Iran. 
3. "Intermediate Coalition": Same conditions apply as for the "Small Coalition" above, 
except that the Iranian oil exports to the Small Coalition countries are not 
compensated by higher exports to other markets ,and the Iranian output of crude oil 
decreases with 20%. 
Both the "Small Coalition" scenario and the "Intermediate Coalition" scenario 
correspond closely to the situation that has been decided to be in force of 1 July 2012 
(short of any further unplanned escalation). The difference between the two coalition 
scenarios depends on the behaviour of the countries that do not participate in the 
embargo, and the characteristics and flexibility of the global oil market. In the "Small 
Coalition" scenario the assumption is that the non-participating countries do not 
forego on a longer term the opportunity to have more easy access to Iran's oil, unless 
they are forced to by events (such as "Hormuz") or are joining the "Grand Coalition". 
In the "Small Coalition" scenario the global output of crude oil does not change from 
the business-as-usual case, and we only observe a change in oil trade relations. In the 
"Intermediate Coalition" scenario the non-participating countries do not trade and 
consume the excess oil output of Iran, the global output of crude oil decreases with 
the amount corresponding to 20% of Iran‟s production. The observed reality is likely 
to lie somewhere in between the "Small Coalition" and the "Intermediate Coalition", 
with the latter being a realistic scenario on the short-term, and the former likely to be 
observed on the long-term. 
4. "Grand Coalition": All countries in the world impose a unilateral oil import boycott 
from Iran, shutting down part of its production (Iran still produces for internal needs). 
5. "Hormuz": The Strait of Hormuz is blocked and no oil exports are let through 
anymore
5
. Two scenarios are being reviewed, depending on the availability of 
pipelines going through the Red Sea and Israel-Lebanon (Saudi Arabia), Syria and 
Turkey (Iraq), and the soon to be ready UAE pipeline (see Table 2). 
a. "Hormuz Optimistic (High Pipeline Capacities)": It is assumed that the 
existing pipeline export capacity in the Gulf region is fully available and will 
be used. In this scenario about 60% of the oil production of the "Gulf" (excl. 
Iran) can be exported through the pipeline system. 
b. "Hormuz Pessimistic (Low Pipeline Capacities)": Only part of the existing 
pipelines capacity will be available. Due to the recent turmoil in Syria, a long-
standing ally of Iran, we assume that the pipelines through this country are 
                                                        
5
 Any "Hormuz" scenario may lead to a full-blown conflict including military action. However, we only take 
into account the effect of the changed oil supply (i.e. supply shock and alternative routes through pipelines), and 
we discard the costs and impacts of a potential conflict itself.  
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totally unavailable. In this scenario about 45% of the oil production of the 
"Gulf" (Excl. Iran) can be exported through the existing pipelines. 
 
Table 2. Alternative oil export pipelines (mb/d)
6
 
Capacity max Currently used Low pipeline High pipeline
East-West Pipeline (Petroline) 5 2 5 5
Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) 0.5 0.5
Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) 1.5 1.5
Iraqi Pipeline through Saudi Arabia (IPSA) 1.65
Strategic Pipeline 0.7
Iraq-Turkey 1.6 0.3 0.3 1.6
Iraq-Syria-Lebanon (ISLP) 0.7 0.5 0.7
Total 5.3 9.3  
For the scenarios 1-5 above, a further differentiation regarding the availability of spare 
capacity for oil production in Gulf countries (labelled "high spare" and "low spare") is 
explored with the POLES model. The macro-economic analysis with the GEM-E3 model 
assumes fixed oil supply (i.e. none of the crude oil producers has any spare capacity). As a 
default, the results presented in this report bear on the "low spare capacity" estimate. 
Table 3 summarizes the assumptions on production/export capacities elaborated on the basis 
of the scenarios described above. 
Table 3. POLES assumptions on production/export capacities for Gulf countries (mb/d) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1a. Baseline - high spare Gulf countries 26.70 27.43
1b. Baseline - low spare Gulf countries 22.91 24.55
2a. Small Coalition - high spare Gulf countries 26.70 27.43
2b. Small Coalition - low spare Gulf countries 22.91 24.55
3a. Intermediate Coalition - high spare Iran 4.41 4.25 3.98 3.43 3.98 4.25
Other Gulf countries 22.29 23.18
3b. Intermediate Coalition - low spare Iran 4.27 4.15 3.91 3.43 3.91 4.15
Other Gulf countries 18.64 20.40
4a. Grand Coalition - high spare Iran 4.41 4.25 3.50 2.02 3.50 4.25
Other Gulf countries 22.29 23.18
4b. Grand Coalition - low spare Iran 4.27 4.15 3.44 2.02 3.44 4.15
Other Gulf countries 18.64 20.40
5a. Hormuz Blockade - high pipe Gulf countries 22.91 24.55 23.84 14.84 23.84 24.55
of which export cap. 17.70 19.17 18.30 9.30 18.21 18.75
5b. Hormuz Blockade - low pipe Gulf countries 22.91 24.55 23.84 10.84 23.84 24.55
of which export cap. 17.70 19.17 18.30 5.30 18.21 18.75  
Depending on the nature of the model used, the scenarios are implemented in different ways. 
In GEM-E3, we assess a situation in which oil supply is affected for one year; and related oil 
prices would also increase accordingly. Note that, unlike for POLES − in which the high oil 
prices trigger a demand (and supply) reaction with some delay − in GEM-E3 the markets and 
prices adjustment is immediate. Therefore, the GEM-E3 oil prices cannot be directly 
compared with the POLES oil prices for one year. Nevertheless, the relative increase in oil 
prices across the scenarios are in line with the increase in POLES oil prices for the average of 
the two consecutive years 2012 and 2013: oil prices rise by more than 80% in the "Hormuz 
optimistic" scenario, and more than 120% in the "Hormuz pessimistic" case compared to a 
                                                        
6
 mb/d = million barrels per day 
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baseline (low spare) scenario. The output describes the response emerging under this 
assumption.  
In POLES, under the “Grand Coalition” and "Hormuz" scenarios it is assumed that the 
embargo results in a partial reduction of the Iranian oil export volumes in 2012, and that the 
consequences of the embargo come to full impact in 2013, which is gradually relaxed during 
2014. Therefore, by 2013 Iranian oil exports are blocked fully and Iran continues to produce 
oil for domestic supply only. On top of this, under the "Hormuz" scenarios the oil export 
levels Gulf countries exports are limited by the available pipeline capacities. The optimistic 
scenario refers to 100% of existing and on-going pipeline capacities (9.30 mb/d) while the 
pessimistic one only considers existing and operational pipelines (5.30 mb/d), excluding the 
option via Syria
7
.  
In the OURSE model, the POLES assumptions are replicated, taking in consideration that the 
regional disaggregation of OURSE is significantly less detailed than those of GEM-E3 and 
POLES. In particular, in OURSE, Iran forms part of a much larger region, the Middle East 
region.  
Interpretation of Model Results 
As we work with three different model families, each model result should be interpreted in a 
distinct way: 
- The GEM-E3 results are of comparative static nature, and reflect the annual impact of 
imposing the constraint during a full year in the year 2010. 
- For the POLES model the full constraint lasts 1 year (2013) with an additional year of 
transition to the normal situation (2014). The impacts last longer than the duration of the 
constraints, due to long-lasting changes in consumption and investment. Depending on the 
severity of the constraint this can be felt up to 2020. 
- The full effect on demand for oil products is felt in 2014: this is why that year was chosen to 
conduct the analysis of the refining sector with the OURSE model. 
                                                        
7
 Due to the on-going unrest in that country and its long-term strategic alliance with Iran. 
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4. Results 
In the following, the oil supply and price effects will be discussed first, followed by the 
macro-economic impacts calculated for the different scenarios.  
4.1. Oil supply 
Table 4 below displays the evolution of the oil production by country group in the baseline 
scenario. It shows a slow growth of the liquid fossil fuel production, coming from OPEC, 
non-conventional oil and biofuels. 
Table 4. World liquid fuel production in the Baseline (low spare), 2000-2020 
Production (mb/d) 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Crude production
Gulf, of which 20.4 22.4 22.0 24.6 27.2
     Iran 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.2
Other OPEC 9.7 11.4 11.7 12.6 13.4
Non-OPEC 43.5 46.3 46.9 46.3 45.0
Other liquids
Heavy, tar sands, shale oil 0.6 1.2 1.6 2.5 3.5
Coal- and Gas-To-Liquid 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.17
Biomass-To-Liquid 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.46 0.72
Total oil 74.3 81.3 82.2 86.1 89.1
Total l iquids from fossil 74.3 81.3 82.3 86.2 89.3
Total liquids 74.3 81.4 82.5 86.6 90.0  
Source: 2000-2010: IEA; 2015-2020: POLES model results 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 below provide the change in production levels compared to the baseline 
for the "Grand Coalition (low spare)" and the "Hormuz Optimistic" scenarios. In the "Grand 
Coalition" scenario the temporary sharp decrease in oil output from Iran is compensated by 
the other Gulf countries. The resulting oil price increase (see below Table 6) leads to a small 
contraction of oil demand compared to the Baseline. 
The situation is highly contrasted in the "Hormuz Optimistic" scenario. Here, the 
disappearance of Gulf output in 2013 profoundly perturbs for a long time the oil market; total 
global output is reduced by about 10%. The resulting high oil price and the volatility triggers 
investment in non-OPEC regions, that see their oil production increasing substantially, by 
about 5% over 2015-2020. As a consequence, the swing production (OPEC, and most notably 
Gulf) is depressed up to 2020 compared to the Baseline situation. This situation is close to 
what happened in the early 80s after the second oil price shock. 
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Figure 2. Oil production – Grand Coalition (low spare) vs. Baseline (low spare) 
 
Source: POLES model results 
 
Figure 3. Oil production – Hormuz Optimistic vs. Baseline (low spare) 
 
Source: POLES model results 
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Potential of strategic oil stocks 
Simulating the five scenarios considered does not take into account the possible utilisation of 
strategic oil stocks but it is assumed that stocks could be used in order to fill the temporary 
gap between demand and supply in the case of a major oil shortage. According to the latest 
information available from the International Energy Agency, 37% of the total stocks in IEA 
countries (4142 Mb) are government-controlled and the remaining 67% are industry stocks 
which include commercial
8
 stocks as well as strategic stock obligations imposed by the 
respective governments.  
The EU has implemented its own oil stockholding system which has been revised (Council 
Directive 2009/119 /EC). This revision concerns enhancing the system, bringing it into line 
with the existing rules of the IEA and optimising administrative obligations in Member 
States. Many countries are also bolstering their own stockpiles and several, such as China and 
India, have major storage projects at various stages of development.  
In assessing the necessity to initiate a co-ordinated action, the IEA considers multiple factors 
beyond the gross peak supply loss caused by the event. The decision depends on the expected 
duration and severity of the oil supply disruption, and also takes into account any additional 
oil which may be put on the market by producer countries.  
Table 5. Stock levels and drawdown rates for one year's oil disruption. 
Stock Level (Mb) Drawdown rate - 12 months (mb/d)
IEA Members 4142 11.3
of which government-controlled 1531 4.2
Other* 749 2.1
Total 4891 13.4
* excluding Gulf countries  
Table 5 establishes stock levels and drawdown rates in order to have an idea of the theoretical 
potential of oil stocks based on a 100% utilisation of stocks (industry and government-
controlled) for a period of 12 months. It is necessary to keep in mind that the growth in stocks 
by emerging countries (like China and India) or the fact of building up again stocks by main 
consumers after an oil disruption would cause a rise in demand and would contribute to 
higher oil prices. 
 
4.2. Oil price 
Figure 4 shows the recent evolution of oil prices for Brent and WTI (West Texas 
Intermediate) in constant US $2005
9
, taken from the US EIA
10
. This document reports the 
Brent spot price. The chart clearly shows the increase in prices (in particular Brent) in the first 
months of the year 2012. This is in line with the IEA Oil Monthly Report, which reported that 
in January 2012, spot crude oil prices increased due to rising tensions between Iran and the 
West.  
                                                        
8
 Commercial stocks are held by private companies or final consumers to guarantee the smooth functioning of 
their plants or vehicles between the discrete re-fills of tanks, or in the expectation of financial gain in case the 
future price might be higher than the current one. Strategic stocks, on the other hand, are meant to deal with 
extraordinary situations, which constitute a security threat to the nation. 
9
 We applied the deflator provided by the US BEA to convert current prices in constant $. 
10
 The EIA provides the latest data on oil price at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
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The “Iran premium” of perhaps 10-20$ in the oil price that may be observed since last autumn 
to some extent reflects the hedging behaviour of some major players, anticipating a possible 
escalation of events (up to important disruption in the Hormuz Strait).  
 
Figure 4. Recent evolution of oil price, January 2007 - April 2012 
 
 
This on-going evolution in 2012 is better reflected in the POLES results obtained with the 
assumption on "low spare capacity". We therefore keep the assumption of low spare 
capacities for the years 2011-2012 as the default setting for the analysis for the scenarios 
"Intermediate Coalition", "Grand Coalition" and "Hormuz". From 2013 the model simulates 
endogenously how the capacity evolves thereafter unless explicitly stated. 
As explained earlier, the "Small Coalition" is considered as being neutral in terms of crude oil 
price evolution in the POLES model, since it results only in a shift of the crude trade flows. 
The "Intermediate Coalition" results in a slight increase of the oil price in 2012-2013 
compared to the Baseline. The "Grand Coalition" has a more severe impact on the oil price in 
2013, up to levels that are actually pretty close to the situation observed in January – April 
2012. 
 
Table 6. Impact on oil price, 2010-2020 ($2005/bbl) 
Scenario # 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Baseline - high spare 1a 101 89 87 89 93 96 99 105 112 117
Baseline - low spare 1b 101 99 94 95 100 104 107 113 117 121
Intermediate Coalition - high spare 3a 101 89 88 89 92 95 98 105 112 115
Intermediate Coalition - low spare 3b 101 101 97 95 99 103 107 113 118 123
Grand Coalition - high spare 4a 101 91 93 89 91 94 97 104 111 117
Grand Coalition - low spare 4b 101 104 105 97 98 100 103 110 118 125
Hormuz - high pipe 5a 101 107 242 134 106 104 102 99 100 103
Hormuz - low pipe 5b 101 107 321 130 97 97 92 87 86 88  
 
The "Hormuz" scenarios lead to a price peak in 2013. From 2015 onwards, the oil price 
remains lower than in the "Baseline" due to the demand reduction triggered by the oil price 
peak. This reaction can be compared to the counter-shock that followed the price shocks in 
the mid 70s and early 80s, as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The 4 periods refer to changes 
in the oil demand profile, as shown in the Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 5. Oil price evolution, 1970 – 2020 
 
Source: POLES model results; historic data: EIA 
 
4.3. Impact on oil demand 
The evolution of world oil demand since 1970 is given in Figure 6. We identify 4 historical 
trajectories:  
 1970-1973 (phase 1): before the 1st oil shock (1975) oil demand was growing fast. 
 1974-1978 (phase 2), between the 1st and the 2nd oil shocks: the price first stabilises oil 
demand, which then resumes its growth at a slightly lower rate than in phase 1. 
 1979-2005 (phase 3): after the 2nd oil shock the oil demand decreases during 5 years, 
then restarts growing with a flatter slope than in phase 2. It takes 10 years to recover 
the pre-1980 level. 
 2005-2010 (phase 4): oil demand grows slowly, the oil price remains high. The 
baseline trajectory (4a) displays a consistent trajectory with these recent 
developments. Here the adjustment between demand and supply goes through a price 
increase, the demand being driven by the sustained economic growth in many 
developing regions while supply remains fairly stable. Indeed, it appears that the room 
for new discoveries is much smaller compared to those that took place in the late 80s 
and early 90s, thus limiting the scope for more production and lower oil price. 
 "Hormuz" scenarios – oil price shock (phase 4b): as in the early 1980s the oil demand 
declines substantially compared to baseline. In 2014, global oil demand decreases by 
more than 9% and more than 11% for the "Hormuz optimistic" and "Hormuz 
pessimistic" scenarios, respectively. Even though demand growth picks up again from 
2015 on, it takes more than 10 years to recover the 2010 level and to converge towards 
the Baseline situation (4a). 
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Figure 6. Global oil demand, 1970 – 2020 
 
Source: POLES model results; historic data: IEA/Enerdata 
 
4.4. The oil bill in the world economy 
Since the 1980s, the cost of oil (in terms of GDP expressed in PPP) has been declining in the 
OECD to remain at relatively low levels in the order of 1-2% for about two decades. With the 
rise in oil prices in the years 2007/8 and more recently in 2010/11 combined with the effects 
of the economic downturn, the oil bill has exceeded 3% of the GDP of OECD countries in 
recent times. Under the baseline, the oil costs would slightly decrease from today's levels and 
remain more or less stable thereafter. This trend is altered only to a limited extent in the 
Grand Coalition scenario. On the contrary, in the Hormuz cases oil costs would rise to much 
above baseline levels for a few years before they would then fall below the baseline levels and 
remain there for some years. This is largely due to the comparably low oil demand in the 
Hormuz case combined with the lower oil prices in the long run.  
Figure 7. Oil cost for the OECD, 1980-2020 (% GDP) 
 
Source: POLES model results; historic data: IEA/Enerdata 
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Revenues from oil exports 
Since the early 2000s the Gulf countries experienced an increase of oil export revenues
11
 with 
a sharp rise in 2008, which was counterbalanced in 2009 due to the combined effect of the oil 
price decrease and the economic crisis. Under the “Grand Coalition” and the “Hormuz 
optimistic” cases, the oil export revenues of Gulf countries would increase compared to the 
baseline for a short period of time due to the higher oil price, and in the Grand coalition case 
also due to the higher export levels in order to compensate for the disruption in Iranian oil. 
However, their revenues decrease after a few years and reach values below the baseline 
levels, particularly pronounced in the "Hormuz" scenarios. This is due to both lower prices 
and lower oil exports compared to the baseline that are the consequence of an overall lower 
demand and an increase in the non-Gulf oil supply in the Hormuz case. The increase in the oil 
price and the growing importance of non-Gulf oil suppliers also imply a temporary rise in the 
oil revenues of non-Gulf producers.  
4.5. Impact on GDP 
Changes in the oil price have a direct effect on the GDP of all economies. In general, for oil 
importing countries, factors affecting the GDP impact are influenced by the dependency of 
the economy on (imported) oil, which in return is largely dependant on the structure of the 
economy and the available domestic resources. For oil exporting countries, the oil export 
revenues – due to price and quantity effects - are key to the overall economy. 
Table 7 reports the GDP effect under the five main scenarios
12
 compared to the baseline 
scenario for the 27 EU Member States as well as for Major Economies such as USA, China, 
India, Russia, Japan, and Canada. The table also lists the GDP effects for Iran and the Gulf 
region
13
. Table 7 is discussed more in detail in Section 5. 
The macro-economic impacts are calculated using GEM-E3. As an equilibrium model the 
results reflect the situation when all parts of the economy, i.e. industrial sectors, government 
and consumers have fully adapted to the shocks in oil supply. In other words, the calculation 
does not take into account any transaction costs. Similarly, the oil sector is modelled as a 
single, flexible global market. Countries that substitute oil from Iran do no face any search 
costs for finalizing existing contracts and looking for new providers. 
Table 8 shows the impacts of the oil shock supplies on the various sectors of the economy 
(aggregated on a global level). The fossil oil sector (incl. oil products and refineries) is the 
sector that is affected most severely and their output decreases up to -17% for the Hormuz 
Pessimistic scenario. This is a direct effect of the shock in oil supply. Road, air and water 
transport are all oil-intensive and this sector shows a strong impact due to the oil scarcity (up 
to -5% of their activity). The impact on other sectors (electricity, industry and construction, 
agriculture, and services and government) is smaller but still significant for the 'Hormuz' 
scenarios. The other sector that feels almost no impact is the other energy carriers (in 
particular gas). Here, the lower activity levels of the global economy are compensated by a 
higher demand due to substitution away from the expensive oil.  
                                                        
11
 Export revenues are defined as the as net crude exports multiplied with the Brent price in constant US$2005. 
12
 In GEM-E3, we assess situations in which the different scenarios are in force for one full year. Oil price 
increases for the different scenarios GEM-E3 are 0% for the "Small Coalition", 5% for the "Intermediate 
Coalition", 16% for the "Grand Coalition", 85% for the "Hormuz" scenario, and 122% for the "Hormuz 
Pessimistic" scenario. These price changes are consistent with POLES. 
13
 Following the GTAP 7 categories the 'Gulf' includes Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Palestinian Territories, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen.  
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Table 7. GDP effects across the various scenarios 
Vs. Baseline (%) 
Small 
Coalition 
Intermediate 
Coalition 
Grand 
Coalition 
Hormuz 
Hormuz 
Pessimistic 
Austria -0.01 -0.12 -0.43 -1.90 -2.62 
Belgium -0.01 -0.16 -0.57 -2.48 -3.42 
Bulgaria -0.01 -0.16 -0.56 -2.56 -3.52 
Cyprus -0.02 -0.24 -0.86 -3.80 -5.30 
Czech Republic -0.01 -0.19 -0.69 -3.07 -4.23 
Germany -0.01 -0.15 -0.54 -2.41 -3.34 
Denmark 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 -0.33 -0.39 
Spain -0.01 -0.15 -0.55 -2.44 -3.37 
Estonia -0.01 -0.24 -0.87 -3.74 -5.07 
Finland -0.01 -0.14 -0.49 -2.13 -2.92 
France -0.01 -0.15 -0.54 -2.46 -3.42 
United Kingdom 0.00 -0.09 -0.30 -1.32 -1.80 
Greece -0.05 -0.20 -0.63 -2.70 -3.73 
Hungary -0.01 -0.11 -0.41 -1.79 -2.48 
Ireland -0.01 -0.11 -0.39 -1.67 -2.25 
Italy -0.01 -0.13 -0.46 -2.03 -2.80 
Lithuania -0.02 -0.24 -0.89 -3.85 -5.30 
Luxembourg -0.01 -0.13 -0.48 -2.14 -2.94 
Latvia -0.01 -0.24 -0.90 -3.89 -5.36 
Malta -0.02 -0.28 -1.00 -4.38 -6.03 
Netherlands -0.01 -0.14 -0.50 -2.22 -3.06 
Poland -0.01 -0.17 -0.62 -2.77 -3.83 
Portugal -0.01 -0.22 -0.80 -3.58 -4.95 
Slovakia -0.01 -0.20 -0.71 -3.13 -4.33 
Slovenia -0.01 -0.13 -0.48 -2.11 -2.92 
Sweden -0.01 -0.17 -0.59 -2.61 -3.62 
Romania -0.01 -0.25 -0.92 -4.12 -5.71 
EU27 -0.01 -0.14 -0.49 -2.18 -3.01 
Rest of Europe 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.51 0.85 
USA 0.00 -0.09 -0.31 -1.40 -1.93 
Japan -0.02 -0.12 -0.38 -1.70 -2.38 
Canada 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.28 0.46 
Oceania 0.00 -0.15 -0.29 -1.32 -1.82 
Brazil 0.00 -0.12 -0.57 -2.32 -3.07 
China 0.00 -0.20 -0.46 -2.01 -2.78 
India 0.01 -0.08 -0.83 -3.72 -5.31 
Russian federation 0.03 0.45 1.66 7.82 11.05 
Iran -0.38 -5.68 -16.80 -17.64 -17.97 
Gulf 0.05 1.03 3.81 2.11 -2.04 
Rest of the World 0.01 -0.06 -0.25 -0.79 -0.89 
World 0.00 -0.10 -0.34 -1.46 -2.05 
Source: GEM-E3 - own calculations 
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Table 8. Global sectoral impacts on output 
World 
Vs. Baseline (%) 
Small 
Coalition 
IntermediateCoalition 
Grand 
Coalition 
Hormuz 
Hormuz 
Pessimistic 
Fossil Oil Sector 0.00% -1.12% -3.09% -13.31% -17.23% 
Coal, gas, biofuels 0.01% -0.03% -0.07% -0.06% 0.00% 
Electricity 0.00% -0.06% -0.21% -0.96% -1.32% 
Industry and Construction 0.00% -0.07% -0.24% -1.06% -1.48% 
Transport -0.01% -0.75% -0.75% -3.65% -4.99% 
Agriculture 0.00% -0.03% -0.12% -0.61% -0.89% 
Services and Government 0.00% -0.03% -0.12% -0.51% -0.71% 
Source: GEM-E3 - own calculations 
 
Figure 8: Density and Sulfur Content of Selected Crude Oils 
 
Source: EIA (2012) 
4.6. Impact on the oil product market 
The impacts on the oil product markets have been analysed with the OURSE model. All 
major assumptions on demand trends, oil prices etc. were harmonised with the POLES results 
(and therefore also GEM-E3). Note that the regional disaggregation in OURSE does not allow 
differentiating between Member States, nor does it allow an aggregation on the EU-27-level. 
Instead, OURSE provides results for Southern Europe and Northern Europe (representing the 
refining markets Mediterranean and North-West Europe), which are aggregated here, and 
contain additional countries than the EU Member States (see section 2). In particular the 
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inclusion of the oil-producer Norway in Northern Europe and also of Turkey in Southern 
Europe implies that results are different from what might be expected for the EU-27 only.  
The OURSE model results show hardly any impact on the oil refining sector in the 'Small 
Coalition', 'Intermediate Coalition' or 'Grand Coalition' scenarios. This is due to the 
substitutability of Iranian crudes by other crude or blends of crude which offer similar 
properties and refining behaviour (Figure 8). Therefore, under these conditions, the 
production of Arabian light and Arabian Heavy as well as that of Forcados would be 
increased so as to replace the lower export levels from Iran. The results indicate that the 
quantities needed to fully substitute Iranian crudes are technically available in these scenarios. 
Given that the long term price equilibrium between the Iranian crude oil and their substitute 
corresponds to the equilibrium in quantity terms between these crude oils, no major change in 
the long term prices spread should occur even if some movements could appear in the short 
term 
Moreover, the difference in the prices between Iranian light and heavy and their substitutes is 
negligible according to an estimation of the long term equilibrium between crude oil prices.  
Hence, both for Northern and for Southern Europe, no significant reduction in refinery output 
can be observed in the 'Intermediate Coalition' or 'Grand Coalition' scenarios (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Change in European refinery production levels across scenarios in 2014 
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Source: OURSE model results 
This situation changes significantly in the "Hormuz" scenarios with its more severe oil supply 
constraints. Here, two effects can be observed that influence the European refining sector in 
opposite directions.  
 Firstly, the high oil price drastically reduces the global and European demand for oil 
products (see also section 4.3). As a consequence of this, refinery output would be 
reduced. 
 Secondly, the oil supply disruptions from Middle East would result in a change in 
global trade patterns of both crude and oil products. In particular Asia, which currently 
imports a large share of their oil from Middle East, would face shortfalls in their oil 
supply. Hence, it would increase its imports of refined oil products in particular from 
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North and South America and Russia. This in return leads to less Russian exports to 
Europe and to Africa. Increasing European oil product export levels would 
compensate for some of the missing Russian exports to Africa. This development acts 
to increase European refining output. 
In total, these counteracting trends mean that European refining sector output would decrease 
less than the European demand for oil products. As a consequence, the share of own 
production in the overall consumption rises and net imports decrease (see Figure 10). 
European net export levels of oil products in the "Hormuz" scenarios would remain more or 
less at baseline levels, but the destination of exports would change with more exports being 
directed towards Africa, and less to North America.  
Within Europe, the Southern European refining sector would be more strongly affected than 
that of Northern Europe, which keeps its production almost constant throughout all scenarios. 
This is due to a higher degree of dependence from crude oil imports from Middle East in 
Southern Europe, with some Member States such as Greece and Italy importing a relevant 
share of their crude oil supplies from Iran (around 12-13%) whereas the imports of Iranian 
crude is very limited in Northern European countries.  
Figure 10. Origin of oil products imports to Europe in 2014 
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Source: OURSE model results 
5. Discussion 
Already in the "Baseline" scenario a slightly decreasing oil demand in 2012 can be expected. 
This is the consequence of the slowdown of world economic growth in 2012
14
 combined with 
the high level reached by the oil price in 2011. On the production side, the situation in Libya 
is assumed to get back to normal in 2013, by when it would reach its 2010 production levels, 
while Iraq's production keeps increasing steadily. The oil price then tends to decrease 
compared to 2011 for a couple of years. However, oil demand increases in emerging 
economies combined with limited capacity to expand oil production capacities worldwide will 
finally drive the price up in the mid-term.  
                                                        
14
 According to GDP assumptions from IMF. 
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The "Small Coalition"
15
 scenario has no effect on the global and EU economies compared to 
the Baseline. Also the impact on Iran's economy is very modest (-0.38% of GDP). The 
international oil market adjusts itself to the unilateral embargo of the 'Small Coalition' where 
the participating industrialised countries replace the supply from Iran by supply from the 
other countries. Iranian crudes would be substituted by a blend of other crudes that offer 
similar properties. In turn, Iran sells higher volumes to the non-participating countries such as 
China and India. 
In the "Intermediate Coalition" scenario the international crude oil supply shrinks with the 
amount corresponding to 20% of Iran‟s output of crude oil in the baseline. With a GDP cost 
of 0.06% and 0.14%, respectively, the effect on the global and EU economies is limited. 
However, the impact on Iran's economy is more significant (-5.68% of GDP).  
In the "Grand coalition"
16
scenario, all countries participate in the embargo of Iranian oil, 
and it is assumed that the world no longer has access to the Iranian oil. The Gulf countries 
increase their production to compensate, to some extent, the production in Iran that cannot 
reach the international market. That is close to the 2011 situation when Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates compensated for the Libyan production losses induced by the conflict 
(yearly production of Libya declined by 70% in 2011 compared to 2010). In the "Grand 
Coalition" scenario, these two countries act again as swing producers in 2013. However, the 
total global oil supply is slightly reduced assuming that the global spare production capacity 
is very low. Hence, the oil price lies above its baseline levels in 2012 and 2013 by some 
5$/bbl and 11 $/bbl, respectively. 
The lower availability of crude oil for the world economy has a cost of 0.34% of GDP 
compared to the baseline. However, the costs of this embargo are not evenly distributed 
across the participating countries. As expected, Iran is the single country that is most heavily 
affected. This global embargo reduces its economy by about 17%. With a GDP decrease of 
0.49%, the EU on average suffers more than the global economy. Countries with a heavy 
reliance on oil imports compared to their GDP are also relatively strongly affected. India (-
0.83%) belongs to this group, but also EU countries like Malta (-1.00%), Romania (-0.92%), 
the Baltic States (-0.87% to -0.90%), Cyprus (-0.86%) and Portugal (-0.80%). Countries with 
relatively lower oil imports compared to GDP can contain the negative impact. They limit 
their oil imports either because they are very energy efficient such as Japan (-0.38%), or 
because they have an important domestic production of crude oil, such as USA (-0.31%) and 
UK (-0.30%). Major oil exporting countries such as 'Gulf' (+3.81%) and Russia (1.66%), and 
to a lesser extent Canada (+0.04%) and 'Rest of Europe' with Norway (+0.07) benefit from the 
Iran oil embargo as they can sell their oil exports at higher prices, and would also increase 
their production levels. 
In the "Hormuz" scenarios, the world economy not only is cut off from the Iranian crude oil 
exports but also from a significant share of the Gulf oil production (either 40% in the 
optimistic scenario or 60% in the pessimistic scenario).  The disappearance of a large share of 
the international market supply results in a more than doubling oil price. This oil price 
increase leads to substantial demand reduction that eventually balances the market. In the 
longer term, alternative oil supply would also play a role, but short term capacities are 
extremely low.  
                                                        
15
 Note that this scenario has not been assessed with POLES since the model's representation of the oil market 
("one great pool") does not allow capturing its effect. 
16
 As mentioned before, this scenario refers to Grand Coalition with low spare capacities available. 
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The negative impact on the world economy is quite strong with a cost of 1.45% in the 
optimistic scenario and 2.05% in the pessimistic scenario. In other words, lower availability 
of the Gulf oil production of 15 percentage points causes an additional 0.60 percentage points 
reduction of the global economy. This also underlines the role of any potential spare capacity 
that may be available beyond the Gulf region in order to keep the impacts on the global 
economy limited. The Iranian economy contracts with about 18%. Also under this scenario 
the EU economy is more negatively affected (between -2.18% and -3.01%) than the global 
average.  
The group of countries with a heavy reliance on oil imports compared to their GDP again 
have the highest impact. In the pessimistic scenario, their GDP may suffer a negative impact 
of 5-6%. The USA and UK, which have an important domestic production of crude oil, show 
slightly lower negative GDP effects than the global average, whereas Japan is a bit more 
affected than the world economy. The even higher oil prices in the Hormuz scenario increase 
the revenues of the major oil exporting countries. Russia, in particular, benefits with an 
increase of GDP by 7.82% and 11.05%. As the production capacity of the 'Gulf' is directly 
affected, its GDP effect oscillates between -2.04% and 2.11%, depending on the availability 
of oil pipelines through which exports can be re-directed.  
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6. Conclusions 
The combined analysis of five main scenarios with three different modelling tools that 
complement each other allow to draw some conclusions on possible impacts of the Iranian oil 
embargo on the economy, the energy sector and the refinery market, despite the caveats and 
limitations explained further below:  
 The analysis shows that a unilateral embargo by the "Small Coalition" – countries 
hardly has an effect on Iran‟s economy. The "Grand Coalition" and "Hormuz" 
scenarios, however, have an impact of 17-18% of GDP on Iran‟s economy.  
 Impacts on the international oil market are negligible in the "Small Coalition" 
scenario. They are limited in the "Intermediate Coalition" and "Grand Coalition" 
scenarios, whereas they are significant for the "Hormuz" scenario, in particular under 
the assumption of low pipeline export capacities. 
 The impact on the EU GDP in the worst scenario "Hormuz pessimistic" scenario could 
reach -3% compared to a baseline, with important differences across EU Member 
States influenced by the importance of oil in their economy, and almost 2% in the 
USA. At global level, the GDP could be reduced by around 2%. 
 The size of the economic impacts of the "Hormuz" scenarios (between 1.5 and 2% 
loss of global GDP) makes them unlikely to be very „stable‟ scenarios on the long-
term. 
 In the two "Hormuz" scenarios we assume that either 45% or 60% of the Gulf oil 
exports can be transported through existing pipelines. Even though the difference 
seems of limited nature (i.e. 15 percentage points), it leads to drastically different 
results in terms of global GDP (0.6 percentage points). This shows that the world 
economy becomes increasingly sensitive to supply shocks the scarcer the oil becomes. 
This also underlines the possible role of spare capacity beyond the Gulf region. 
 The scenarios not only have losers but also winners. In particular the major oil 
exporting countries as Russia and some Gulf countries (depending on the scenario) 
could benefit from the increase in oil prices. To a lesser extent Canada and Norway 
could also gain temporarily from oil scarcity. However, under the Hormuz scenarios 
almost all oil producing countries would loose out in the mid-longer term due to the 
persistent demand destruction induced. 
 The costs of oil in the OECD and the EU economy would only be slightly affected in 
the 'Grand Coalition' scenario, but could more than double from today's (elevated) 
levels for one year in the "Hormuz" scenarios. Thereafter, however, it would fall 
rapidly again to reach below-baseline levels due to the lower oil demand. 
 Refinery output in both Northern and Southern Europe remains more or less at 
baseline levels in the 'Intermediate Coalition' and 'Grand Coalition' scenarios in 2014. 
The larger volumes of Iranian crudes that are currently used in Southern Europe can 
be replaced by a blend of different other crude types without any major increase in 
prices. In both 'Hormuz' scenarios, the Southern European refinery output would 
decrease due to a higher dependence on oil imports from Middle East. All in all, 
though, the total European refinery production decreases less than demand, leading to 
higher exports and a larger share of own production compared to the baseline.  
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7. Caveats and limitations 
The different nature of the models needs to be taken into consideration when interpreting the 
results. GEM-E3 (and also OURSE) are models that calculate an equilibrium under given 
circumstances; their results are thus of static nature. POLES, on the contrary, is a simulation 
model that represents explicitly the evolution over time of the markets, and, hence requires 
more time to reach a new equilibrium between oil supply and demand. Despite the different 
nature of the modelling approaches, the reading of the model results provide a coherent 
picture on (a) the relative price changes for each scenario; (b) the evolution of the bill of the 
imported oil and export revenues determined with the sector model POLES which is in line 
with the macro-economic results of the global multi-sectoral model GEM-E3, and (3) the 
evolution of trade of different oil products, refinery use and oil varieties, as reported by 
OURSE. 
However, a scenario analyses is not a stochastic approach in which probabilities are given for 
each potential input variable, and as a consequence of this an expected magnitude of the 
impacts can be derived. This report, however, presents a quantitative analysis of the potential 
implications of the Iranian oil embargo under a coherent set of framework assumptions and 
illustrates the transmission mechanisms of those effects. 
The results discussed here raise a number of important questions that will need to be further 
analysed in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of an oil supply 
disruption following an embargo on Iranian oil.  
 The role of gas in the Iran crisis remains an open question. Qatar, the 5th producer of 
natural gas in 2010 (120 bcm) and by far the main LNG exporter (77 bcm in 2010), 
will be cut off from its costumers under the Hormuz scenarios.  
 One could wonder whether the weak status of the economy in some countries of the 
EU, Japan or USA may affect the economic impacts of Iran oil embargo. In the last 
year, some countries have relatively reduced their oil imports (e.g. in order to adjust 
their current balance), whereas other countries saw their oil/GDP intensity worsened 
(e.g. due to a deterioration of their financial sector). These recent evolutions may 
slightly influence the results of this analysis in opposite directions.  
 A more detailed assessment may be done on the role that can be played by the swing 
producers who have sufficient spare production capacity that is not normally used but 
can be brought on the market quickly. Oil market analysts believe that the oil 
producing countries need to hold at least 5 percent of global oil demand in order to 
maintain stable prices (McNally, 2012). The 5 percent spare capacity rule needs stable 
and calm geopolitical conditions, as was the scenario during most of the 1990s. Since 
2003, however, OPEC‟s spare capacity has been low and geopolitical disruption risks 
have multiplied (e.g. Arab Spring, Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Georgia). 
Consequently, oil prices have been high and volatile. Given the current threats, the 
spare production capacity may need to be higher than 5 percent to reassure the 
markets. Moreover, Saudi Arabia may become unavailable as swing producers under 
the more extreme scenarios of this study (i.e. 'Hormuz'). Therefore it is equally 
important to look for available capacity beyond the OPEC, i.e. in Russia (1
st
 on the oil 
producers ranking), USA (3
rd
), China (5
th
), Canada (6
th
), Brazil (9
th
) and EU and 
Norway (both 13
th
). 
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